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The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis, by Peter Fur-
long. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. viii + 239. $99.99 (hardback).
W. MATTHEWS GRANT, University of St. Thomas (MN)
The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis is a fantastic 
book of a sort few could have written. Proponents of divine determin-
ism would have struggled to press objections against the view with the 
force that Peter Furlong presses them. On the other hand, opponents of 
divine determinism frequently seem unable to imagine how anyone could 
be attracted to the view, and, thus, perhaps even more so would have 
struggled to take as seriously as Furlong does a consideration of possible 
replies to the objections. Not until the very end of the book, do we learn 
that Furlong, who once thought that “if divine determinism was true, then 
human life is a sham” (219), is “now agnostic on the question of divine 
determinism” (220). Furlong, then, refrains from offering a final verdict 
on whether the objections to divine determinism are ultimately fatal. 
Revealing the findings of his study early on, he reports that, “in the end, 
it seems to me, that although this view carries numerous non-negligible 
costs, none of the problems is obviously decisive (which, of course, is not 
to say that they are obviously not decisive)” (8).
Furlong defines “divine determinism” loosely as “the view that 
everything that occurs is a consequence of God’s will—a will both com-
plete and irresistible, such that the entire history of the universe is set-
tled by what God ordains” (1). Although he briefly references some of 
the formidable historical figures that might be classified as “divine deter-
minists” and discusses in about ten pages some of the motivations that 
have attracted thinkers to the view, he makes it clear that he is unable 
to address the “vast field of issues” that would be required to evaluate 
the benefits, and thus to offer an overall assessment, of divine determin-
ism (7). Rather, The Challenges of Divine Determinism restricts itself to an 
evaluation of objections to divine determinism in light of possible replies. 
This self-imposed restriction seems well considered. Furlong treats just 
about every objection to divine determinism in great detail. There would 
not have been space for a responsible consideration of the benefits of the 
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view, or for an overall assessment, within the same volume. To provide 
an overall assessment would have required weighing divine determin-
ism’s “non-negligible costs” against its benefits and comparing them to 
the costs and benefits of competing views. Understandably, that was more 
than the volume could bear.
Despite what it doesn’t do, The Challenges of Divine Determinism is must 
reading for anyone interested in the viability of divine or theological deter-
minism. It is well written, carefully argued, and fair. Readers on all sides 
will benefit from Furlong’s clarity, thoroughness, mastery of the literature, 
and judicious reluctance to reach verdicts too quickly. Sure to be a refer-
ence point for future discussions, the book is also suitable for adoption in 
graduate or upper-level undergraduate courses.
After an introduction that sets out the plan for the book, Furlong turns 
in Chapter 1 to offer a more precise working definition of determinism, 
to consider its motivations, and to distinguish two types of divine deter-
minism. While he notes that authors have defined divine determinism in 
slightly different ways, he settles on a definition that makes clear that, 
for divine determinism, facts about God’s will both entail (or condition-
ally necessitate) and explain every other contingent fact. According to 
“Edwardsian divine determinism,” God creates an initial state of the 
universe (with any contingent causal laws there may be), and every sub-
sequent state follows necessarily from the first. According to “primary 
divine determinism,” there isn’t an initial state of the universe from which 
every subsequent state follows necessarily, but we should rather think of 
God’s creation as a single act in which every detail of the universe is set-
tled and explained by God’s willing it, much in the way every detail of 
a novel is settled by its author. Among the motivations for divine deter-
minism, Furlong discusses passages from scripture, the phenomenon of 
prophecy, the principle of sufficient reason, making sense of scriptural 
authorship, and concerns about divine power, knowledge, aseity, sover-
eignty, and providence.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider objections that divine determinism rules out 
creaturely freedom and responsibility. Furlong does not attempt to settle 
the question of whether freedom and responsibility are compatible with 
determinism in general. Rather, he considers whether adapted versions of 
the most powerful arguments against the compatibility of free will and 
ordinary physical determinism apply with the same force against the 
compatibility of free will and divine determinism. Chapter 2 considers an 
adaptation of the Consequence Argument aimed at divine determinism 
and Chapter 3 considers an adaptation of Manipulation Arguments.
Furlong has some interesting things to say about how divine deter-
minists might respond to Manipulation Arguments, but in this review-
er’s opinion, whatever force Manipulation Arguments have against the 
compatibility of free will and determinism derives entirely from what 
those arguments have in common with the Consequence Argument. It 
seems to me that Furlong judges rightly that the Consequence Argument 
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is powerful (if not indisputable), and that it would (with adaptations) 
apply with the same force to divine determinism as it does to ordinary 
physical determinism. Especially helpful is Furlong’s lengthy discussion 
of attempts by divine determinists to explain how their position is com-
patible with creaturely freedom. These attempts may show that divine 
determinism does not make a creaturely act absolutely necessary, but that 
point does not address the Consequence Argument. The Consequence 
Argument is not objecting that determinism renders acts absolutely neces-
sary. Rather, it objects that determinism rules out freedom because it pre-
cludes our having responsibility for our acts, since it entails that our acts 
follow necessarily from explanatorily or causally prior conditions over 
which we have no control.
Chapters 4 and 5 take up, respectively, the questions of whether divine 
determinism makes God the cause of human sins and whether it makes 
God blameworthy for human sins in virtue of determining their occur-
rence. With an eye on the former question Furlong considers the “priva-
tion solution” according to which God does not cause human sin because 
he does not cause the privation or defect—the lack of conformity to the 
moral standard—in virtue of which an act is sinful. According to one ver-
sion of this approach, the modest privation solution (MPS), the lack of 
conformity is caused only by the creature, not God. Furlong offers a for-
midable objection to the MPS, to the effect that the lack of conformity to 
the moral standard will simply follow from the positive aspects of the 
world; thus, if God causes all the positive aspects of the world (as divine 
determinists presumably hold), he will also cause the lack of conformity, 
at least if we assume the lack of conformity is the sort of thing that admits 
of a cause (incidentally, I attempt to address an objection of this sort in 
work published too late to have been considered by Furlong). Furlong 
proposes in the place of the MPS a more radical privation solution (RPS) 
on which internal relations, such as “the lack of conformity to the moral 
standard,” are strictly speaking incapable of being causal relata, with 
the consequence that they cannot be caused by God. Although the RPS 
merits further consideration, two questions initially present themselves: 
first, will God on the RPS still explain the lack of conformity even if God 
doesn’t technically cause the lack of conformity; and, if so, is that a prob-
lem? Second, how serious a cost is it to give up the asymmetry allowed by 
the MPS, according to which the lack of conformity to the moral standard, 
though not caused by God, is caused by the sinful creature?
Furlong considers a number of possible responses to the objection 
that God’s determining the occurrence of sin makes God blameworthy. 
He judges that all the responses have costs, but that some combination of 
responses is likely successful for a divine determinist willing to assume 
the costs. In my view, several of the determinist responses considered 
admit of development in a form stronger than that presented by Furlong. 
In considering the appeal to divine authority, for instance, more could 
be said about the nature and moral basis of that authority—why it isn’t 
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simply a matter of raw power. More could be said about how the scope 
of God’s responsibility differs from the scope of human responsibility, 
and how this difference might be relevant to evaluating whether God is 
blameworthy. More could be said about what God does and doesn’t owe 
creatures. And more could be said about the goods God may be aiming 
to make possible by including moral evil in the world. Without consider-
ation of these goods and their relation to moral evil, it may be difficult to 
judge whether God is doing anything blameworthy in determining that 
the world include moral evil for the sake of these goods—and this point 
holds true whether or not we embrace consequentialism, since consequen-
tialism is not the only moral theory on which the ends of action play a 
critical role in its justification. I do not mean to imply that Furlong entirely 
neglects these sorts of questions (he doesn’t), and there is admittedly only 
so much an author can do in limited space.
Chapter 6 considers whether divine determinism rules out the Free Will 
Defense as a response to the problem of evil. Furlong discusses in detail 
a number of recent attempts to show that it does not. Although the best 
of these attempts is successful on its own terms, Furlong points out that 
the terms are not ones many divine determinists would accept, making 
it of limited value to divine determinists in responding to the problem of 
evil. Although Furlong’s discussion of these attempts is careful and illu-
minating, I was surprised by the comparative brevity of his treatment of 
responses to the problem of evil that do not rely on the Free Will Defense. 
These responses, which typically invoke goods made possible by moral 
evil, are to my mind more promising for the divine determinist. There 
are indications that Furlong may agree, as he comments with reference to 
such responses that “the case for the high cost of determinism in this mat-
ter [the problem of evil] is not as strong as it might initially appear” (158).
I found chapters  7 and 8 to be, perhaps, the most interesting of the 
entire book. Chapter 7 offers discussion of two more challenges for divine 
determinism, one concerning God’s love for creatures and another con-
cerning creatures” love for God. Many theists have thought that God’s 
love for human beings is something analogous to a good parent’s love 
for his or her children. But how can that sort of analogy be sustained if 
God determines that some human beings are perpetrators and some vic-
tims of horrifically wicked acts? The problem is intensified if we add that 
God determines that some creatures spend eternity in Hell. Furlong con-
siders a number of solutions to this problem, some of which he judges 
hopeless, others of which he thinks more promising provided the divine 
determinist is prepared to incur certain “significant costs” (185) of the 
responses adopted. Among these more promising responses include ones 
that involve recourse to sceptical theism, to universalism about salvation, 
to a very strict metaphysics of identity, and to revising or qualifying the 
“parental” model of divine love. To the objection that a human being’s 
love for God is not genuine if that person is determined to love God, 
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Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account, by W. Mat-
thews Grant. Bloomsbury, 2019. Pp. viii + 248. $114 (hardback).
SIMON KITTLE, University of Leeds
W. Matthews Grant’s Free Will and God’s Universal Causality is a system-
atic presentation and defence of what he calls the Dual Sources account of 
divine and creaturely agency. The Dual Sources account comprises two 
Furlong judges that there are a number of promising responses that do 
not incur serious costs.
Chapter 8 takes up four related challenges to divine determinism, all 
of which stem from the seeming implication of divine determinism that 
God wills our acts of sin or wrongdoing. First, doesn’t God deceive us 
by issuing commands against acts of wrongdoing, implying that they are 
contrary to his will, when all the while he determines that we sometimes 
do them? Second, if God wills that we sometimes commit acts of sin, isn’t 
that incompatible with a common theistic understanding that we should 
conform our actions to God’s will? Third, if our past sins have been willed 
by God, won’t we be opposing ourselves to God’s will if we repent of 
them? Fourth, isn’t it absurd for God to blame and punish us for sinful 
acts that he determines us to perform? Furlong explores a number of pos-
sible responses, judging, once again, that the objections can be answered, 
but that doing so involves certain costs.
Throughout most of the book, Furlong sets himself to “examine the log-
ical space in which divine determinists might stake out their positions, 
rather than constructing, proposing, and defending a particular view” 
(220). In the brief conclusion, however, in addition to revealing his own 
agnosticism regarding divine determinism, he reveals a bit more regard-
ing which lines of reply he finds most promising in response to each 
objection, and which objections would worry him most were he a divine 
determinist. He also offers some helpful remarks regarding the nature 
of philosophical disputes in which conflicts of intuition can have such a 
strong influence on what disputants are prepared to acknowledge as a 
reasonable position to hold.
The Challenges of Divine Determinism is a book that presents challenges 
mostly to divine determinists, but indeterminists may find themselves 
challenged as well. It is a rewarding read, and a significant contribution to 
contemporary philosophy of religion.
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